Managing Agency Problems in Early Shareholder Capitalism — The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance

Small business of-interest —  example given.

Excerpt: The evidence of the efficacy of captain ownership in Liverpool shipping is notable given the inconsistent results regarding the influence of CEO stock ownership in contemporary organizations. As scholars and policymakers continue to debate the precise behavior elicited by top-management-team stock ownership today, our results provide useful evidence concerning the effect of equity ownership in an analogous setting. These results also enhance our understanding of the range of mechanisms used to support far-flung and difficult-to-monitor economic transactions in the days when communications lagged far behind physical trade.

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