The Political Economy of Insider Trading Law and Enforcement — The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance

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Excerpt:  Those who oppose insider trading regulation often rely on the private interest theory of regulation to explain how these laws, despite their presumed inefficiency, are enacted to satisfy influential private interests. In contrast, those who support insider trading restrictions rely on the public interest theory of regulation to explain how insider trading regulation is enacted to address market failures. The two theories are rarely merged into a single framework. However, because insider trading and its regulation concern the distribution of property rights to use private corporate information, the issue has both private (distributional) and public (efficiency) dimensions. I take both dimensions into account in this study.

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